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TOWARD A REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PIRACY
By Clyde H. Crockett*
The 1958 Geneva Convention altered the traditional laws of
piracy. The Convention appears to have removed the acts of
States and political groups from the deterrent effect of piracy
sanctions. Professor Crockett traces the development of the laws
of piracy and notes the existing ambiguities and problems. He
suggests that in light of continuing acts of violence at sea and
inadequacies of existing laws, revision is in order.
I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout its long history, the international law of the sea has
undergone gradual modifications which have reflected an accom-
odation of changing sovereign, political and economic interests.
Today, as the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea nears the end of its work, very significant and occasionally
drastic amendments are being recommended in many areas of the
law.' To date, the emphasis of the Conference has been on innova-
tion.2 However, the extensive work of the Conference also presents
an excellent opportunity to resolve long-standing differences of
opinion and to clear up ambiguities and errors contained in the
1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the last major revision
* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University; B.A., University of Texas; J.D., Uni-
versity of Texas; L.L.M., London School of Economics; Member, State Bar of Texas.
1. For example, the concept of the economic resource zone has the potential of placing
under the jurisdiction of coastal states extensive maritime areas which have, since the
17th century, been regarded as high seas. The economic resource zone and other proposals
reflect changes in values and interests as well as the emergence of new ones, particularly
those shared by developing states. The proposals are contained in United Nations Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea: Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.
62/WP. 8/Part I (1975), 14 INT'L LEG. MAT. 682 (1975).
2. This is attributable to the recognition of new interests and new technology which
makes possible the exploration of deep sea resources. See Stevenson, The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of Sea: the 1974 Caracas Session, 69 AMER. J. INT. L. 1
(1975); Adede, The System for Exploitation of the "Common Heritage of Mankind, " at
the Caracus Conference, 69 AMER. J. INT. L. 31 (1975); INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA AND
THE FU'rURE OF DEEP SEA MINING (Joyner ed. 1975); THE LAW OF THE SEA: NEEDS AND
INTERESTS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES-PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEVENTH ANNUAL CONFERENCE
OF THE LAW OF THE SEA INSTITUTE, UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND, 1972 (Alexander ed. 1973).
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in this area. The discussion which follows is devoted to one partic-
ular area, the law of piracy, where it is suggested revision should
be considered.
Piracy, as defined by the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, :'
has remained apparently untouched and unconsidered. However,
as is obvious to any observer of the international scene, acts of
violence committed on the high seas continue to be a problem,
and could well become a major source of international friction
and dispute. This Article will examine two related types of inci-
dents. The first concerns the illegal use of force by a State di-
rected against merchant vessels, as when a State authorizes the
commission of an act of violence at sea on the basis of a mistaken
view of its rights. The second concerns the use of force on the high
seas by persons who are acting out of political motives. For in-
stance, a group intent upon overthrowing its national government
may seize an innocent merchant vessel in order to achieve suc-
cess. It is evident that these types of cases differ from the popular
conception of piratical acts, i.e., those committed by a band of
sea outlaws who are concerned strictly with selfish gain. Under
traditional views of piracy held before the 1958 Convention, au-
thority was more or less equally divided on the question of
whether acts of violence by States or political groups were piracy.
In an effort to settle this issue, the 1958 Geneva Convention on
the High Seas adopted a test which makes the actor's liability for
piracy turn upon whether the act is for "private ends." The pri-
vate ends test does not have a precise definition, but generally an
actwill be deemed to have a private end if it is without lawful
authority and is committed for personal gain or revenge. Acts of
violence by governments or organizations acting for political ends
usually are not considered to be for private ends, and thus do not
meet the definition of piracy. The Geneva formulation, albeit
vague, probably intended to exclude from piracy the above exam-
3. Convention on the High Seas, opened for signature April 29, 1958, [19621 U.S.T.
2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 [hereinafter cited as GENEVAI. Articles 13
through 21 deal with specific aspects of piracy. The provisions, as well as this Article, deal
only with the international law of piracy, not municipal laws which provide for punishing
certain acts as piracy. For a discussion of the differences between municipal law piracy
and piracy jure gentium, see Dickinson, Is the Crime of Piracy Obsolete?, 38 HARV. L. REV.
334 (1925).
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ples, and excludes many variations of acts associated with a State
or with a non-selfish motive.
International law, however, does not exist in a vacuum. There
will continue to be violent acts on the high seas and reactions by
States to those acts. Such reactions must be considered in order
to interpret the meaning of the Geneva test and to evaluate its
effectiveness. Two recent incidents provide illustrations of these
areas of concern and a backdrop for the discussion that follows.
The first is the May 1975 seizure of a United States merchant
vessel, Mayaguez, by the crew of a Cambodian patrol boat in the
Gulf of Siam, sixty miles off the coast of Cambodia.4 The Presi-
dent of the United States officially declared the act to be piratical
and ordered remedial action, which resulted in the rescue of the
vessel and its crew. ' The second incident involved the seizure of
a Japanese freighter, Sheiro Maru, in a Philippines port in Sep-
tember 1975, by members of a group seeking to overthrow the
government of the Philippines. The government denounced the
seizure and described it as piracy, intervened and recaptured the
vessel.'
In these circumstances, piracy is a frequently encountered de-
scription. Yet, it is difficult to determine whether the term is used
only to accentuate the heinousness of the act in question in order
to engender public support, or is reflective of a decision that the
acts qualify legally as piracy so as to justify remedial acts. Such
official government characterizations may well be evidence of
State practice leading to the development of a customary norm.
Even though the Mayaguez and Sheiro Maru incidents may not
have involved piracy, a major power's denouncement certainly
has a substantial effect on customary international law. Such
declarations by major powers could set a dangerous precedent
leading to the development of a permissive norm allowing the
commission of retaliatory acts which tend to cause further
breaches in international peace and security. The present ambig-
4. New York Times, May 13, 1975, at 1, col. 8.
5. It was reported that members of the Legal Adviser's Office of the State Department
did not agree with the description of the seizure as piracy. New York Times, May 13, 1975,
at 19, col. 6. The recapture of the Mayaguez by the use of force was denounced as an act
of piracy by the People's Republic of China, New York Times, May 17, 1975, at 17, col.
2.
6. New York Times, Sept. 30, 1975, at 3, col. 1.
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uous status of the law of piracy provides an excellent field for the
development of such norms.
II. THE CONCEPT AND SIGNIFICANCE OF PIRACY
Piracy is admittedly difficult to define. In order fully to appre-
ciate the difficulty that commentators and drafters have had with
defining piracy, one must be aware of the unique consequence of
characterizing an act of piracy. The jurisdiction of all States may
be asserted to pursue, capture and punish the perpetrator of such
an act, and to seize and condemn the pirate ship. Jurisdiction is
not confined to the State or States whose interests have been
directly injured. The reason for this extraordinary jurisdiction lies
in the danger, either actual or potential, that the acts pose to
commonly held interests, particularly the necessity that the seas
be safe for economic intercourse, passage, and for military and
scientific purposes. If there is a threat to these universally shared
interests, then the act would generally qualify as an act of piracy.7
Thus, given the wide array of acts which could upset these inter-
ests, specific and detailed definitions have proved difficult and
unsuccessful.
While recognizing the slippery nature of the concept, some ju-
rists occasionally have hazarded short-hand definitions of tradi-
tional piracy. The type of acts which qualify as piracy have been
defined generally as "acts of violence"' or "armed violence at sea
7. Admittedly, this general characterization is somewhat circular. But it is clear that
not all robberies or murders committed on the high seas would be piracy, i.e., that they
would authorize the assertion by any state of its jurisdiction. For example, if a cabin boy
stole goods from a passenger, the act would not be piracy, for the threat to the freedom of
the sea is not sufficiently serious.
8. See, e.g., 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 558 (7th Lauterpacht ed. 1948). See
also W. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 271 (7th Higgins ed. 1917). An attempt was made to
specify which acts are or are alleged to be piracy, as follows:
1. Robbery or attempt at robbery of a vessel, by force or intimidation, either
by way of attack from without, or by way of revolt of the crew and conversion
of the vessel and cargo to their own use.
2. Depredation upon two belligerents at war with one another under commis-
sions granted by each of them.
3. Depredations committed at sea upon the public or private vessels of a state,
or descents upon its territory from the sea by persons not acting under the
authority of any politically organised community, notwithstanding that the
objects of the persons so acting may be professedly political. Strictly all acts
which can be thus described must be regarded as in a sense piratical.
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which is not a lawful act of war."' More restrictively, piracy has
been defined as theft at sea." General descriptions of the nature
of the act must be considered the correct approach, as there are
many acts which are of universal concern and thus subject to the
jurisdiction of all States. Attempts to define piracy by enume-
rating specific acts which qualify as piracy have proven to be
unsuccessful since circumstances continue to change.
The great majority of definitions have included a qualification
that the acts of violence must be to some degree dissociated from
a lawful authority. The words "unauthorized" and "illegal" have
been used as descriptions of this feature." The difficulty is that
no further effort is made to explain what is "illegal" or "unau-
thorized." In many cases connected with a State, the legality of
an act will be clear by reference to international law. Thus, an
act in self-defense, although it may be violent, would not be ille-
gal. On the other hand, a seizure of an innocent merchant vessel
on the high seas when there is no basis for a claim of self-defense
clearly is illegal under tradional law." The Geneva Convention
makes seizure of merchant vessels illegal when the vessel is not a
pirate ship or engaged in slave traffic.' Between the extremes of
9. See, e.g., In re Piracy Jure Gentium, [19341 A.C. 586.
10. See, e.g., 2 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 657 (2d ed. 1970).
Ii. See, e.g., Art. 15 (1) of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas, note 18 infra.
12. See I D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 315-20 (2d ed. 1970); van Zwanenberg,
Interference with Ships on the High Seas, 10 INT'L & COMPARATIVE L.Q. 785 (1961).
13. Article 22 GENEVA, supra note 3, of the Convention on the High Seas provides a
guide for determining when interference with merchant vessels on the high seas is legally
authorized:
I. Except where acts of interference derive from powers conferred by treaty, a
warship which encounters a foreign merchant ship on the high seas is not justi-
fied in boarding her unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting:
(a) That the ship is engaged in piracy; or
(b) That the ship is engaged in the slave trade; or
(c) That, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, the
ship is, in reality, of the same nationality as the warship.
2. In the cases provided for in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) above, the
warship may proceed to verify the ship's right to fly its flag. To this end, it may
send a boat under the command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion
remains after the documents have been checked, it may proceed to a further
examination on board the ship, which must be carried out with all possible
consideration.
3. If the suspicions prove to be unfounded, and provided that the ship boarded
has not committed any act justifying them, it shall be compensated for any loss
or damage that may have been sustained.
[Vol. 26:78
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a valid claim of self-defense and the total lack of such a claim,
there are gray areas. For example, if a State acts on the basis of
necessity, is the act nevertheless illegal? 4 Another area of uncer-
tainty, which will be discussed later, involves the legality of acts
by groups which do not qualify as States. 5
In addition to illegality, another element common to many
definitions of piracy is the objective of the actor. The determina-
tion of objective is the cornerstone of the two most elaborate
formulations-the Draft Convention on Piracy, prepared by the
Harvard Research in International Law, and the 1958 Convention
on the High Seas, both of which provided that in order for the act
to qualify as piracy it had to be for "private ends."
Article 3 of the Harvard Draft provides:
Piracy is any one of the following acts, committed in a place
not within the territorial jurisdiction of any state:
1. Any act of violence or of depredation committed with
intent to rob, rape, wound, enslave, imprison or kill a person or
with intent to steal or destroy property, for private ends with-
out bona fide purpose of asserting a claim or right, provided that
the act is connected with an attack on or from the sea or in or
from the air. If the act is connected with an attack which starts
from on board ship, either that ship or another ship which is
involved must be a pirate ship or a ship without national charac-
ter.
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a
ship with knowledge of facts which make it a pirate ship.
3. Any act of instigation or of intentional facilitation of an
act described in paragraph 1 or paragraph 2 of this Article. 7
The comments to Article 3 note the difficulty and importance
of the definition and indicate further the great variety of views
of writers on such a definition. Article 3, and the Harvard Draft
Convention as a whole, represent more than a codification of
14. See E. BROWN, THE LEGAL REGIME OF HYDOSPACE 143-45 (1971) for a discussion of
cases involving necessity.
15. See text accompanying notes 40-50 infra.
16. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 8, at 558.
17. Harvard Law School, Research in International Law, Codification of International
Law (pt. 4 Piracy) [hereinafter cited as HARVARD RESEARCH], 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 743
(Supp. 1932). The draft convention contains 19 articles and is, along with the comments,
a valuable collection of sources for any research in the international law of piracy. Al-
though the convention per se has never been adopted, its impact upon the development
of the law of piracy is unquestioned.
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customary international law. Both have had a significant and
continuing effect on the development of the law of piracy. The
piracy articles of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas (Arts.
13-21), which represent present law on this subject, were based,
to a great extent, on the Harvard Draft provisions. Article 15 of
the Geneva Convention"s and Article 3 of the Harvard Draft are
nearly identical in substance and use similar language.
III. "THE PRIVATE ENDS" AND "PRIVATE VESSEL" EXcEPTION
The Geneva Convention is the most prominent statement on
the law of piracy today. The Convention has entered into force,
having been ratified by the great majority of sea powers. " How-
ever, many interpretational problems and ambiguities are posed
by its provisions. The Mayaguez case illustrates the complexities
of piracy and the broader problem of attempts to codify a contro-
versial subject matter. It is assumed that the Cambodian act was
an "illegal act of violence." The Mayaguez was not engaged in
illegal surveillance of Cambodia nor in any other type of activity
which arguably would have justified or excused the seizure under
the doctrines of self-defense or necessity. However, Article 15
requires that the pirate ship be "private" and in pursuit of "pri-
vate ends." In an objective sense the Cambodian naval vessel was
a public, i.e., non-private vessel. The United States, however,
had not recognized the Khmer Rouge regime, under whose au-
thority the seizure was made. The Convention does not address
the problem of recognition, or lack of it, in making this determi-
18. Article 15, GENEVA, supra note 3, provides:
Piracy consists of any of the following acts:
1. Any illegal acts of violence, detention or any act of depredation, commit-
ted for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private
aircraft, and directed:
a. On the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against per-
sons or property on board such ship or aircraft;
b. Against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the
jurisdiction of any state;
2. Any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;
3. Any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in sub-
paragraph 1 or sub-paragraph 2 of this article.
19. Over 50 States are parties to the convention, including the United States, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
[Vol. 26:78
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nation. Although some support may be found for the proposition
that lack of recognition of a government may justify treating that
government's vessels as "private,"2I the weight of authority calls
for a more objective assessment.'
Even if there were no doubt that a vessel was a government
ship, it is possible that the vessel could be considered a pirate.
For example, Article 1622 provides that acts of piracy committed
by a government ship on which the crew has mutinied are "assim-
ilated to acts committed by a pirate ship." In other words, a
government ship can be considered a pirate ship if a mutinous
crew uses the ship for private ends. However, other than Article
16, there is no provision which provides for an assimilation of a
non-private vessel to a private one. This may indicate that in any
situation other than mutiny, a public ship remains public and,
consequently, cannot be considered a pirate ship under Article 15.
Arguably, it would have been reasonable to impose a rule that
public ships, such as naval vessels and other government-owned
vessels, can never be pirates, although the crew may be guilty of
piracy. This would provide, in effect, that the crew would fall
within the common jurisdiction, but the ship itself would remain
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the flag State.23 Such a rule
20. See, e.g., OPPENHEIM, supra note 8, at 559. C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAl. LAW OF THE
SEA 444 (6th ed. 1967). Cf. The Ambrose Light, 25 Fed. 408 (S.D. N.Y. 1885), where
recognition of a state of war or of belligerent rights with regard to insurgents was viewed
as being necessary to prevent their ships and acts from being held piratical. For a further
discussion of the recognition problem, see Johnson, Piracy in Modern International Law,
43 GRtoTIuS OCIETY TRANS. 63, 79-80 (1957).
21. 1 D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 148-51 (2d ed. 1970).
22. The acts of piracy, as defined in Article 15, committed by a warship,
government ship or government aircraft whose crew has mutinied and taken
control of the ship or aircraft are assimilated to acts committed by a private
ship.
Article 16, GENEVA, supra note 3.
23. Article 8, GENEVA, supra note 3, does provide that "warships" have complete im-
munity from the jurisdiction of any State other than the flag state. A warship is defined
as a "ship belonging to the naval forces of a state . ..under the command of an officer
duly commissioned by the government . . . and manned by a crew who are under regular
naval discipline." If these conditions are not met, the vessel would not qualify as a warship
and would then not be entitled to the immunity afforded by Article 8.
Article 9 further provides that other government ships, e.g., ships owned or operated
by a State and used only for government non-commercial service, such as for scientific
purposes, shall also enjoy complete immunity.
A ship owned by a State and used on commercial service or a ship so owned by a State
1976]
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would eliminate the danger to international peace which would
result from an uninvolved State asserting universal jurisdiction
under piracy law and attempting to punish a pirate vessel belong-
ing to another government.
If one accepts the premise that in some cases State-owned
ships may lose their immunity, does this necessarily mean that
such ships may become "private" vessels for the purposes of
Article 15? By applying the rule of Article 16 to Article 15, it ap-
pears that a government ship can become a private vessel and
pirate ship if it is controlled by a mutinous crew. The conversion
of government ships to private ships in other contexts, however,
is less clear. For example, if a government ship is stolen or taken
over by nationals of another country, the foreign nationals may
perpetrate acts of violence which would be considered piratical
under traditional views. But the Convention articles do not
specify whether this situation would result in conversion of the
government ship to private status. Considering the potential
danger to international peace, such a take-over should convert
the vessel to private status, especially if the foreign nationals
attack ships of innocent countries.
If a conclusion is drawn that a once public ship may be assimi-
lated in diverse contexts to a private vessel or that the public
characteristics of a vessel do not necessarily preclude that vessel
from being a factor in piracy, the most complex interpretational
problem of the Geneva formulation remains the "private ends"
test. 4
The Harvard commentary on Article 3 indicates that the major
problem facing the drafters was how to treat the acts of groups
who are attempting to achieve a political objective rather than
and partially engaged in commercial activities and partially on non-commercial service
would not fall within the immunity afforded by Article 9.
24. The test may be traced directly to the HARVARD RESEARCH which included the test
in Article 3 of its draft convention. Article 3 is reproduced in the text accompanying note
17 supra. The Reporter's comments in the International Law Commission's Report to the
U. N. General Assembly on the piracy articles, state as follows:
In its work on the articles concerning piracy, the Commission was greatly as-
sisted by the research carried out at the Harvard Law School, which culminated
in a draft convention of nineteen articles with commentary . . . . In general,
the Commission was able to endorse the findings of that research.
Comment to Article 13, Report of the International Law Commission (1956), 2 TBK. INT'L
L. COMM'N 25, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/Ser. A/1955/Add. 1.
[Vol. 26:78
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selfish gain.2' Both the Harvard Draft and the Geneva Convention
adopted the "private ends" test which excluded from the defini-
tion of piracy all acts committed for "political or other public
ends," thus excluding the acts of political groups and States.,
The drafters did not differentiate between political groups who
were acting against a single government versus groups who di-
rectly affected the interests of more than one State. Nor was there
a differentiation between acts of political groups and acts of
States. The "private ends" test was a sledgehammer solution to
a very complex problem. It ignored the fact that there can be
differences in the degree of State involvement and in the nature
of political groups and their acts.
The "private ends" qualification could operate as an escape
device for almost any act of a State or revolutionary political
organization. This exception can hardly be considered wise. The
underlying reasons which support any rule of State immunity are
generally distinct from those which are urged as supporting exclu-
sion of acts of insurgents from the domain of piracy. The next
section will deal with the rationale and desirability of State im-
munity from the law of piracy. The discussion will then turn to
the treatment of insurgents and other organizations of a political
complexion.
IV. STATE PIRACY
That a State may not be guilty of piracy is a treatise proposi-
tion founded in the early days of international law2s and revived
after the Geneva Convention. Several reasons may be suggested
for the rule. It is said that piratical acts "are done under condi-
tions which render it impossible or unfair to hold any state re-
25. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 786 (Supp. 1932).
26. HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 17, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 798 (Supp. 1932).
27. The preamble to the Convention on the High Seas indicates that it represents a
codification of the rules of international law. It would appear, however, that several
articles are more accurately described as modifications or amendments of customary law.
See, e.g., Article 11 which, in effect, is a modification of the law reflected in the celebrated
Lotus case, [1927] P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 10, at 4.
28. See van Bynkershoek, QUAESTONES JURIS PUBLICI, Lib. 1, ch. XVII (1737), translated
by Duponceau, 3 AM. L. J. 1, 258 (1810). See also A. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 661-62 (2d
ed. 1970) where the question of whether a state may be guilty of piracy is described as a
'very nice (unsettled) point."
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sponsible for their commission."29 Theoretically, if Cambodia had
been guilty of an illegal act of violence vis-a-vis the United
States, then Cambodia would have become liable to the United
States under international law for the injury inflicted. The proba-
bility that the wrong will go unredressed is, in the present state
of international law, hardly a valid basis for denigrating the theo-
retical quality of this rationale." In addition, if the common juris-
diction could be asserted vis-a-vis a State, potentially undesira-
ble consequences are evident. The threat to international peace
and stability could be of grave significance if a State whose inter-
ests have not been directly infringed sought to punish a State
which authorized an act of piracy. Finally, it may be suggested
that the legality of an act of violence authorized by a State may
be impossible or impracticable to assess for purposes of piracy.
For example, in the Mayaguez context, the State may have pur-
sued the course it did in an effort to protect what it thought was
a legitimate claim of right, e.g., preventing non-innocent passage
or protecting its economic resource zone.
On the other hand, the purpose of the law of piracy is to provide
an effective means of maintaining the security of the high seas so
that it will be open for trade, commerce and navigation. If the
acts of private individuals acting for purely private ends may
interfere seriously with this shared interest, then a fortiori acts of
violence supported by the State and its resources pose an even
greater threat to commercial and military uses of the high seas.
However, after balancing the threat of State violence against the
danger to international peace from allowing universal jurisdiction
against the offending States, it is reasonable to opt for the rule
that State acts will not be within the definition of piracy. An
additional problem of allowing State acts to be classified as pi-
racy would be defining which acts of a State would be piracy and
which would not. The Geneva Convention has not responded to
this problem. It is not clear whether all acts somehow associated
with a State or authorized by it are excluded.
There was considerable doubt in the pre-1958 period as to
29. A. HALL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 267 (7th Higgins ed. 1917).
30. Nevertheless, the practical impossibility of obtaining reparation for State author-
ized wrongs is a factor to be considered in any revision of the law which deals with the
consequence of that wrong.
[Vol. 26:78
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whether any act of State could be termed piracy.' In an article
published in 1958, the distinguished British authority on this
subject, Professor D. H. N. Johnson, explored the precedents in
response to the question: "Must piracy be committed for private
ends, or can it also be committed by persons acting either on
behalf of a State or at least on behalf of a politically organized
group for a purpose which can reasonably be described as a public
purpose as opposed to a private purpose?"3
In regard to a State, Johnson explored the prominent judicial
precedents, the most famous of which is the case of The Magellan
Pirates, in which Dr. Lushington announced the following view
in dictum:
Even an independent State may, in my opinion, be guilty of
piratical acts. What were the Barbary pirates of older times?
What are many of the African tribes at this moment? It is, I
believe, notorious, that tribes now inhabiting the African coast
of the Mediterranean will send out their boats and capture any
ships becalmed upon their coasts. Are they not pirates, because,
perhaps, their whole livelihood may not depend on piratical
acts? I am well aware that it has been said that a state cannot
be piratical; but I am not disposed to assent to such dictum as
a universal proposition. 3
In an earlier case, The Serhassan Pirates," the same judge held
that attacks by armed vessels under the control of island natives,
directed against British vessels were piratical, even though, in a
sense, the natives were acting on behalf of a "State."
Professor Johnson questioned whether the cases decided by Dr.
Lushington have much relevance today, noting that while the
Barbary pirates "were acting for a sort of public purpose as well
31. In the commentary to Article 3 of the Harvard Draft, this doubt is acknowledged.
See HARVARD RESEARCH, supra note 17, 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 740, 769 (Supp. 1932). In the
same work see p. 798 ff for a collection of authorities. See OPPENHEIM, supra note 8, at
562-63 for a view that States may be guilty of piracy:
There is substance in the view that, by continuous usage, the notion of piracy
has been extended from its original meaning of predatory acts committed on the
high seas by private persons and that it now covers generally ruthless acts of
lawlessness on the high seas by whomsoever committed.
32. Johnson, Piracy in Modern International Law, 43 GROTIUS SOCIETY TRANS. 63 (1957).
33. The Megellan Pirates, 164 Eng. Rep. 47, 48 (1853).
34. 166 Eng. Rep. 788 (1845).
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as for private gain, they can hardly be compared with modern
States."3" The article then considered two other precedents for
treating State-authorized acts as piratical, the Washington Naval
Treaty of 1922, which dealt with excesses of submarines in World
War I and the Nyon Agreement of 1937, occasioned by the naval
atrocities committed against innocent merchant shipping by par-
ties involved in the Spanish Civil War. For many reasons,3" John-
son was able to de-emphasize the precedential value of these
attempted conventional solutions to acts of violence committed
against merchant vessels. Nevertheless, they are indicative of a
continuing dissatisfaction with the traditional view of State im-
munity from piracy and evidence the desire to achieve a satisfac-
tory conventional settlement. It is doubtful that the Geneva
Convention has achieved, or its perpetuation will achieve, this
end.
It might be said that given the variety of acts with which a
State may be associated, it is unwise to foreclose forever the
possibility that a State, or those acting in behalf of a State, may
come within the ambit of piracy. 7 Although it is highly unlikely
35. JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 78-79.
36. It was not until the advent of German submarine activity in the period of the First
World War that the question of State piracy received any serious consideration. The
Treaty of Washington of 1922 represents a response to the German activity. Under that
treaty, persons responsible for the sinking of innocent merchant vessels were subject to
punishment "as if for an act of piracy." The treaty was never ratified by the signatories
and consequently never came into force. S. Doc. No. 348, 67th Cong., 4th Sess. 3118
(1923). The next attempt at conventional treatment of State authorized acts was occa-
sioned by the naval activities of the Spanish Civil War. The Nyon Agreement of 1937
described the attacks of submarines upon merchant vessels as "piratical," "contrary to
the most elementary dictates of humanity which should be justly treated as acts of piracy
.... "The agreement signed by nine States did not apply to merchant vessels in control
of the belligerents in the war. 181 L.N.T.S. 135.
These precedents and authorities were discussed in some detail by Johnson. The prece-
dential value of the Washington Treaty was questioned by Johnson because of the attempt
to extend piracy to war crimes; it was signed by only five States; the London Naval
Limitation Treaty of 1930 in effect overruled its provisions on piracy; and subsequent
events showed that illegal submarine activities could be treated as war crimes without
involving the complexities of the law of piracy. The Nyon Agreement was signed by only
nine States; Spanish merchant vessels were not subject to the protection of the Agree-
ment; and such agreement amounted to an ad hoc collective self-defense measure.
37. The Mayaguez incident is an example of the clearest type of State authorized act.
Obviously, there are many possible variations involving a State in some way. Foreign
mercenaries provide an interesting and complex case falling within the gray areas. At the
present time, there is doubt as to what acts may be, in international law, treated as acts
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that Barbary-type States" will arise in the modern world, there
is the possibility that States may indulge in such excesses that
the security of the high seas will become so threatened that to
invoke the universal jurisdiction would be a reasonable course.
On the other hand, even though the "private vessel-private ends"
qualifications do not absolutely foreclose State piracy, it is sub-
mitted that a less vague, although necessarily general, approach
to the solution of this problem must be possible. It is unlikely that
any State today would act affirmatively on the basis of the Ge-
neva Convention, even though such assertion of its jurisdiction,
based upon the traditional law of piracy, would be reasonable.
Several examples may indicate the breadth of the private ends
exception as applied to cases involving acts associated with a
State:
Case I: The naval forces of State A attack a merchant vessel
of State B in order to prevent non-innocent passage39 through
A's territorial sea. The attack, however, due to a mistake, is
made on the high seas, and there is no justification for the act.
Under these circumstances, the act of State A would not be
piracy under traditional pre-1958 law or the Geneva Conven-
tion.
Case II: State A, in order to lay claim to off-shore mineral
deposits, regularly attacks merchant vessels on the high seas
which stray within a three mile radius of the site of the deposits.
Case III: The President of State A issues orders to vessels
under State control to seize on the high seas any vessels flying
the flag of State B, C, or D. The objective may be revenge or
gain.
In Cases II and III, it would be difficult to conclude that the
attacks and seizures were for private ends. Yet, the threat to the
of the State. Perhaps this problem as it related to piracy, cannot be solved until the more
general aspects of the issue are settled along conventional lines. See the efforts of the
International Law Commission in [1974] 1 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 5-61, U.N. Doc. A/CN.
4/246 and Add. 1-3; A/CN. 4/264 and Add. 1; A/9010/Rev. 1; A/9334.
38. For a sketch of the Barbary States and their status as pirates, see deMontmorency,
The Barbary States in International Law, 4 GROTIUS SocIErY TRANS. 87 (1918).
39. Article 14(4) of the Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, 1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 provides in part: "Passage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal State." Article 16(1) pro-
vides: "The coastal state may take the necessary steps in its territorial sea to prevent
passage which is not innocent."
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freedom of the high seas is sufficiently severe in these cases to
justify the exercise of the common jurisdiction. Thus, under the
traditional theory of piracy, Cases II and III would be piracy.
The Harvard Draft provision and the Geneva test were recog-
nized as expedient measures. To be sure, expediency may dictate
a rule that the common jurisdiction cannot be a ground for action
even when in theory it would be an appropriate basis. Thus, Case
II might well be excluded on the basis of expediency. Yet, there
is very little reason to exclude Case III from the designation of
piracy. It is not the purpose here to suggest specific draft provi-
sions, but it is suggested that appropriate provisions could be
drawn to distinguish various cases which contain an element of
State involvement.
V. POLITICAL GROUPS
In the case of groups organized for the purpose of achieving
some political objective, such as overthrowing an established gov-
ernment in order to gain governmental control of a State, the
dominant view is that such groups can never be guilty of piracy."
To be sure, there are views to the contrary, particularly regard-
ing acts committed in fringe areas." For example, if the acts were
directed against innocent, non-involved third nation vessels or
persons, the acts then could qualify as piracy.
Thus, insurgents and a State were treated differently in some
respects and for good reason. While the quality and degree of the
acts were relevant to determine as to each subject whether its acts
were piratical, the same considerations that support State ex-
emptions do not always or necessarily apply to insurgent exclu-
sion. Hobbesian notions of sovereignty have led to the view that
a people must not be subject to punishment for acts taken to
displace a despotic government. Arguably, denying these groups
the advantages of acting at sea would foreclose their goals.4" Thus,
40. For a collection of these views, see the commentary of the HARVARD RESEARCH, supra
note 17, at 798 et seq.
41. Id. See also OPPENHEIM, supra note 8, at 562 for the view that vessels of insurgents
and States may be treated as piratical.
42. This view has engendered provisions commonly found in extradition treaties, ex-
cepting persons who are sought to be extradited for "political" crimes. The interpretation
of the phrase, left as it is to municipal organs, has proved to be quite troublesome. It is
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other States should not intervene in what is a strictly internal
matter. Where interests of third nations are injured, practical
considerations of potential liability also support this view.43
The Harvard Research departed significantly from traditional
views by adopting the private ends qualification. Such qualifica-
tion was formulated primarily because of the problem presented
by insurgents. The main concern which faced the drafters in 1932,
as well as the International Law Commission in the 1950's, and
the approach to this concern is illustrated by the following com-
mentary on Article 3:
While the scope of the draft convention is controlled by the
international law of piracy, it is expedient to modify in part the
traditional jurisdiction because of modern conditions ....
[T]he draft convention excludes from its definition of piracy all
cases of wrongful attacks on persons or property for political
ends, whether they are made on behalf of states, or of recognized
belligerent organizations, or of unrecognized revolutionary
bands. Under present conditions there seems no good reason
why jurisdiction over genuine cases of this type should not be
confined to the injured state, the state or recognized government
on whose behalf the forces were acting, and the states of nation-
ality and domicile of the offender. Most of these cases would not
fall indisputably under the common jurisdiction by traditional
law, and this is an additional reason for disposing of them as the
draft convention does."
There is a division of authority on the status of acts of insur-
gents and subtle distinctions have been urged on this point. Al-
though there is authority for subjecting States and insurgent
groups to the law of piracy, to the Harvard drafters it seemed best
to confine the common jurisdiction to offenders acting for private
ends only. The intended effect of this qualification is quite signifi-
noteworthy that two closely related legal systems, that of the United States and England,
interpret the term differently. See generally SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1971).
43. For example, it is arguable that if insurgents in the course of an insurrection commit
an act of violence on the high seas, injuring the interests of a non-involved State, no claim
would lie against the government of the State against which the group is in revolt, if the
group were pirates. Also, if the group is successful in gaining control of the government,
it may well prove to be an embarrassment to a State which has denounced the group's
acts as piratical. See JOHNSON, supra note 32, at 80.
44. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 786 (Supp. 1932).
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cant as illustrated by further commentary to Article 16.15 Several
examples are provided which indicate the breadth of the qualifi-
cations. The following would not be piracy: a revolutionary organ-
ization uses an armed ship to establish a blockade against foreign
commerce, or to stop and search foreign ships for contraband, or
to seize necessary supplies from foreign ships. The commentary
disputes the view held by some writers and judicial authorities
that illegal attacks on foreign commerce by unrecognized revolu-
tionaries are piracies in the international law sense. The commen-
tary said: "It is the better view, however, that these are not cases
falling under the common jurisdiction of all states as piracy by
the traditional law, but are special cases of offences for which the
perpetrators may be punished by an offended state as it sees
fit.' 46
Apparently, little thought was directed to the question of State
piracy or variations on that theme, or the questions of acts com-
mitted by individuals for other than personal reasons. Under the
Harvard Rule, however, it made no crucial difference whether the
group interfered with innocent third nation shipping. The Geneva
Convention followed the Harvard approach. Under Article 15,
jurisdiction would lie only with States which were directly con-
cerned, e.g., States who were attacked by political groups and
innocent third party States whose commercial vessels were the
subject of interference.
The most prominent post-1958 incident spotlighting the diffi-
culty in applying Article 15 has been the seizure, in 1961, of a
Portuguese flagship, the Santa Maria, by the self-styled leader of
a movement to overthrow the then government of Portugal. Other
than the attainment of publicity and support for the movement,
the other aims of the movement were obscure. Not unnaturally,
the Portuguese government condemned the act as piracy. How-
ever, the United States and the United Kingdom did likewise. 7
45. Article 16 of the Draft Convention dealt with the problem of States that were
injured directly by acts of violence authorized by States or insurgent groups, providing:
The provisions of this convention do not diminish a state's right under interna-
tional law to take measures for the protection of its nationals, its ships and its
commerce against interference on or over the high seas, when such measures are
not based upon jurisdiction over piracy.
46. 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 857 (Supp. 1932).
47. See Green, The Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates?, 37 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 496 (1961).
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Admittedly, British and American passengers were involved.
A modest scholarly debate ensued, which illustrated the com-
plexity of the Geneva Convention, particularly the meaning and
applicability of the "private ends" exception." The incident it-
self, by virtue of the action of the United States and United
Kingdom, further illustrates the very crux of the problem. Al-
though a politically motivated group may not have the resources
of an established government, such groups often can wreak severe
havoc on innocent ships and persons. To be sure, the United
States and the United Kingdom had direct interests at stake, but
it may also be reasonable to view their characterization as based
upon broader and less tangible interests. Both of these countries
have extensive merchant fleets and obviously did not wish to
create a precedent which could prove embarrassing if their ships
were seized under similar circumstances. If the United States and
the United Kingdom had not called the seizing of the Santa
Maria piracy and if at a later time one of their own vessels was
seized, other countries might fail to aid them, noting that the two
countries had failed to consider such seizures piracy. Certainly,
no definitive precedent was set one way or the other, and such
hesitancy must be traceable to the ambiguity of Article 15.
Another aspect of the Santa Maria case, as well as the Sheiro
Maru and Mayaguez incidents, deserves comment. In these cases,
either the national States or third party States who were directly
affected took remedial action. This normally will be the case
when insurgents are operating close to home or the injury is done
to a military power. However fortunate the results have been,
there have been and will continue to be cases where the injured
State is unable to take action. This is a particularly acute area
of concern because of the substantial number of nations that
possess large merchant fleets but little or no military or other
forms of power. Assuming that negotiations fail in such cases, the
acts of violence might go unredressed under Article 15. The com-
mon jurisdiction could not be asserted because of the wide-
ranging exclusionary effect of Article 15.
Protection of organized political groups could have been ac-
48. See Fenwick, "Piracy" in the Caribbean, 55 AM. J. INT'L L. 426 (1961); Green, The
Santa Maria: Rebels or Pirates?, 37 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L. 496 (1961).
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complished in a general, but less vague, manner." The principal
problem that should be addressed is whether and, if so, to what
extent the displacement of established governments as an inter-
nal matter now outweighs the interest that all States have in the
freedom of the seas. It is curious indeed that under the present
formulation only those posing the least threat to the freedom of
commerce can be pirates.
The seriousness of a restriction on the ability to achieve a just
change of government must be confronted when evaluating the
desirability of a revision of the law of piracy which would result
in classifying a greater number of acts by insurgents as piracy.
Insurgents still would have jurisdiction limited over their acts
where they occur on the high seas against vessels of the State with
which the group is in insurrection. Further, no act occurring
within the land territory or territorial water of any State would
be considered piratical. With the emergence of new types of mari-
time zones, the area of the high seas will shrink considerably,
providing a quite expanded, relatively safe area for the acts of
insurgents. It would appear that if such zones come into exist-
ence, rebels will be fairly accommodated."'
VI. THE DUTY TO SUPPRESS PIRACY
Article 14 of the Geneva Convention on the High Seas provides
as follows: "All states shall co-operate to the fullest extent in the
repression of piracy on the high seas or in any other places outside
the jurisdiction of any state." The Harvard Draft Convention
49. The Santa Maria episode is a perfect example of the difficulty of determining in
this context whether an act is done for private ends. One might understandably turn to
previous State practice or the theory of piracy in order to determine whether the act is
piracy or not. By this means, one could justifiably conclude that the Santa Maria seizure
was piracy.
It would still be necessary to go further to interpret the meaning of private ends in order
to trace its conventional origin to the Harvard Draft. One would then be led to the travaux
preparitoire which would strongly indicate that piracy was not involved. Although the
International Law Commission was influenced by the Harvard Draft, the commentary of
the Commission only indicated that its concern lay with the acts of disputants in a civil
war. If this were the concern, it is curious why such a general and vague test was adopted,
one which would exclude from its scope a single individual who, on the high seas, consis-
tently fired upon innocent merchant vessels in protest, for example, of American wheat
shipments to the Soviet Union.
50. Also, any land area would fall outside the universal jurisdiction.
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contained a similar formulation in Article 18.1'
Although there are some views to the contrary," under the
traditional law of piracy a State has the right to assert its jurisdic-
tion, but is not compelled to do so. If a State does not consider
piracy a crime at all under its municipal laws, such a State may
not have the machinery that is necessary to punish piracy, and
it would be a serious interference with its sovereignty to impose
such a duty.
Under the traditional rules of piracy, a State has the option not
to take any action and may consider extra-legal factors in decid-
ing whether it should act. Besides its general reluctance to treat
piracy as a crime under its municipal laws, it could also take
account of possible retaliation and the potential threat of interna-
tional friction and discord.
If States are under a duty to act it is doubtful that they would
agree to a return to traditional law or a broadening of jurisdiction
over piracy. The duty imposed by Article 14 may explain why the
definition of piracy was framed so vaguely.53 Under a broad, tradi-
tional definition of piracy, States would have been reluctant to
accept a rule which might create liability in numerous situations,
because of failure to suppress piracy. States also may hesitate to
suppress piracy for political, economic, or other non-legal rea-
sons.
5 4
51. Article 18, GENEVA, supra note 3, states: "The parties to this convention agree to
make every expedient use of their powers to prevent piracy, separately and in coopera-
tion."
52. See, e.g., the commentary of the HARVARD RESEARcH and authorities collected there,
28 AM. J. INT'L L. 756 (1932).
53. The comments to the then Article 13, now Article 14, are illuminating in this regard:
The questions arising in connexion with acts committed by warships in the
service of rival governments engaged in civil war are too complex to make it
seem necessary for the safe-guarding of public order on the high seas that all
States should have a general right, let alone an obligation, to repress as piracy
acts perpetuated by the warships of the parties in question.
[19551 2 Y.B. INT'L L. COMM. 25 (emphasis added).
54. An example is the situation of Thailand in the Mayaguez incident. There were Thai
objections to the United States' use of Thailand territory as a base of its operations.
Considering the location of Thailand and the uncomfortable situation of neutral Asian
States during that period of the Vietnam conflict, the Thai reaction was not surprising.
Generally, where the intervention, on the basis of piracy, might well be viewed as an
"unfriendly" act by a State whose interests are directly affected, intervention would be
unlikely.
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In any re-evaluation of the law of piracy, repeal of the duty
should be given serious consideration. It would be unrealistic to
expect States today to accept a duty to suppress piracy, no mat-
ter how general the provision is, if the definition of piracy is
broadened. Of course, in exceptional cases, such as acts of clearly
private individuals acting for clearly private ends, the imposition
of a duty in connection with suppression of such acts probably
would not be objectionable.
VII. CONCLUSION
The effect of the 1958 Geneva Convention has been to confuse
the law of piracy. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to suggest that
piracy has been rendered a dead letter. At any rate, it is doubtful
that States will act except in rare situations on the basis of a right
of jurisdiction based upon piracy.
Obversely, the danger is that the obsolescence of piracy will be
marked by an increase in the commission of illegal acts of viol-
ence on the high seas. Piracy was traditionally an effective deter-
rent. Under the Geneva formulation, piracy can hardly be viewed
as a deterrent at all in view of the fact that it is apparently
directed only at offenders who resemble the classic pirate of chil-
dren's books. First, it should be recognized that the Geneva Arti-
cles, having been borrowed from the Harvard Draft, are not gen-
erally codifications of the customary law of piracy and traditional
doctrine. Under traditional laws of piracy, precedents may be
found for treating some acts closely associated with States and,
particularly, acts associated with groups organized along political
lines as piratical. Second, there are too many acts associated with
a State and acts which can be described as "political," which,
upon serious reflection, should not be exempted from the com-
mon jurisdiction.
Negotiations should give some consideration to the following
matters:
1. Should all acts of State be exempt from the univer-
sal jurisdiction? To analyze and answer this question pro-
perly, traditional notions of State sovereignty and the
threat to international peace and stability should be
weighed against present notions concerning the freedom of
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the seas and the threat to such freedom that acts of vio-
lence pose. In perhaps limited situations, a consensus
would emerge that such acts, although closely connected
to the authority of a State, should fall within the defini-
tion of piracy. Many factors, including, for example, a
State's refusal to reparate the injury or a clear showing
that an act is not based upon a claim of right or necessity,
may lead to rules for specific cases.
2. Should all acts of politically organized, or similar
groups, and of all individuals who are not acting for per-
sonal gain, revenge, etc., be excluded from the common
jurisdiction? In reaching this decision, it will be necessary
to balance the need of political groups to have means
available for changing governments against the need for
freedom and security on the high seas. The shrinkage of
the "high seas" area would by itself call for a re-evaluation
of the Geneva treatment of insurgents."
The common jurisdiction associated with piracy is an illustra-
tion of an effective means of enforcing international law and is an
excellent deterrent in that legal system. The issue is not one of
semantics. In any new formulation, the term piracy could be
discarded. Due to its epithetical connotation, however, the term
probably should be retained for the deterrent capability it pos-
sesses. Unfortunately, if the present definition and qualifications
persist, piracy jure gentium will be defunct. Revision of the law
of piracy is in order.
55. The proposals being made at the present time would allow each coastal State to
create an economic resource zone which could extend as far as 200 miles from the coast.
This area would not be "high seas," to which the law of piracy is applicable. Obviously,
cases of piracy, even if limited acts of State and acts of political organization are included,
rarely will be encountered if a substantial number of such zones are created.
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